How will we ever get to Mars if we can't even use digital signatures?
Last month I posted two things on Twitter directed at EU's Digital Agenda staff: (1) first a question on when will we get videoconferencing support for meetings in Brussels and (2) I proposed they start using digital signatures in all mail they send out.
.@DigitalAgendaEU All mail coming from EC/EU institutions should be digitally signed. Set an example & promote cross-MS CA recognition.
Digital signatures is old-tech in internet-measured time. All the relevant standards were defined at the turn of the century and EU even passed the Directive 1999/93/EC in 2000, which defines the legal framework for the use of digital signatures. All major e-mail software vendors support S/MIME and I believe most countries have set-up their own government-operated Certificate Authorities (CA) so they could provide all those modern e-government services.
So why aren't we using this technology? It's true that the current CA system is broken. In my opinion it is not broken because of some fundamental design flaw, it is rather a problem of settling for a commercialized version of identity assurance. Do we go to private companies to get our passports? Of course not. But we do buy commercial certificates from privately-owned CAs. Why? I guess because the "solution" to the PKI happened in the 1990s and everyone wanted a piece of the internet "make-money-fast" miracle (VeriSign and Thawte didn't do that bad financially, did they?). So it's natural that with the incentive to grab ever larger market shares and the constant need to cut down costs, security and security-related procedures are sooner or later trimmed down or stepped over by commercial CAs. And then we get DigiNotar and Comodo incidents. Are there any government-owned CAs that have been compromised? Not that there is no possibility for that, but still - you see my point.
But let's get back to the subject.
APT has been the buzzword of 2011. Someone sneaking into your network and instead of wreaking complete and immediate havoc, they rather inspect, spread and quietly siphon your information off to a distant location. One of the common attack vectors for that is social-engineering via e-mail that includes malicious attachments. Government officials all over the world receive various "last-minute agenda changes" or "formal letters from UN" (or European Commission for that matter) that are sent to them by rogue parties and try to infect their computers via the latest PDF reader vulnerability. Or offer links that will lead to web sites loaded with all the latest Java exploits. Some of these are stopped by e-mail scanners and antivirus software, but a number of them still gets through this defense (some 0-day flaws get patched only after a month or so, which gives bad guys plenty of time to do their stuff).
(The rumor has it that some of these attacks are even sponsored or performed by governments of other countries, but -Shhh! You didn't hear this from me!)
Now imagine this: one day the European Commission announces that all mail that they send out is going to be digitally signed by their own CA (hold on: not encrypted, signed only). Sysadmins maintaining mail servers all over EU (other parts of the world too if they care) can now add another simple filter. If the message is signed by the trusted CA-issued personal certificate, the mail with the attachment goes through. If not, the attachment is removed and placed in the quarantine, while the recipient of the message gets the text-only version with the explanation that the attachment is available in the office downstairs where the IT security people are inspecting it. And the important thing is that you are not breaking anything for those that don't have support for digital signatures. They will see an odd smime.p7s attachment, but that's all. You don't eliminate the problem of malicious attachments altogether, but in this line of business we all know we're never 100 % there. But you do add another obstacle, that's certain.
OK, if EC has problems with that maybe one of the countries that will take the 6-months EU presidency soon (Cyprus and Ireland are to follow the now-presiding Denmark) can find this interesting?
It is my experience that these ideas are often met with arguments on how difficult is to set up EU-wide (or worldwide) PKI system where we will have a clean, smooth hierarchy and we will all agree on the root authority that will recognize national CAs. But we don't need that really. Banks sometimes operate their own CAs and just give you instructions how to add them to your certificate store. And we use that. There are systems that use web of trust models (PGP/GPG for example). It may not be perfect, but it's still a step in the right direction.
Bad guys will adapt and will try with rogue CAs, attacks on legitimate CAs and so on, no doubt about that. But that is still much harder than just forging the stupid "From:" address in a message.
And please, let's just leave Gmail's lack of support for S/MIME out of this debate, OK? If they add S/MIME support, we might even start encrypting mail which in turn may present a bit of a problem for Google's business model.








